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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of buyer mergers, which are mergers between
downstream rms from dierent markets. We focus on the interaction between the merger's
eects on downstream eciency and on buyer power in a setup where one manufacturer with
a non-linear cost function sells to two locally competitive retail markets. We show that size
discounts for the merged entity has no impact on consumer prices or on smaller retailers, unless
the merger aects the downstream eciency of the merging parties. When the upstream cost
function is convex, we nd that there are \waterbed eects", that is, each small retailer pays a
higher average tari if a buyer merger improves downstream eciency. We obtain the opposite
results, \anti-waterbed eects", if the merger is inecient. When the cost function is concave,
there are only anti-waterbed eects. In each retail market, the merger decreases the nal price
if and only if it improves the eciency of the merging parties, regardless of its impact on the
average tari of small retailers.
Keywords Buyer mergers, non-linear supply contracts, merger eciencies, size discounts, wa-
terbed eects.
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1 1 Introduction
In recent years the grocery industry has undergone a dramatic consolidation.1 A substantial number
of acquisitions have taken place between retailers serving dierent geographic markets, for example,
the expansion by Sainsbury's and Tesco in convenience store retailing in the UK,2 acquisitions of
stores from dierent local markets by Ahold (Netherlands)3 or Carrefour (France).4 In addition to
grocery retailers, in the last decade many cable network operators from dierent geographic markets
have declared their interests to merge. For instance, in 2004 the Kabel Deutschland Group (KDG),
which operates the former broadband cable network of Deutsche Telekom AG in all of Germany
apart from three regions,5 proposed to acquire the network operators in those regions.6 Moreover,
in 2005 Ish and Iesy, which were two cable network operators active in dierent local markets,
merged and became Unity Media7 and in 2010 the German cable network operator Unitymedia
was acquired by Liberty Global Europe Holding B.V. (LGE) of the Netherlands.8
Such mergers between rms from dierent local markets do not raise any horizontal (anti-
competitive) concerns, however, they could signicantly aect the bargaining position or buyer
power of the merging rms when purchasing inputs from a supplier. The supplier might then
change its unit price to other buyers who could be the rivals of the merged entity in dierent
markets. As a result, the buyer merger would modify the competitive conditions and consumer
prices in the downstream markets. In particular, the eects of large grocery chains' buyer power
on consumers and on small independent retailers (e.g., convenience stores) have become one of the
most controversial debate for anti-trust authorities and for academics.9
The common view is that the exercise of buyer power by retailers may lower their purchasing
costs and therefore lead to lower consumer prices.10 On the other hand, as argued by the UK
Competition Commission, \the exercise of buyer power by the merged entity would have adverse
1The concentration ratio of the ve largest retailers (C5) in the 15 member countries of the EU is on average 50%
(IGD European Grocery Retailing, 2005). The UK's top four grocery retailers account for 65% of total retail sales
(the Competition Commission, 2008, p.29). In the US, C8 was 17.5% in 2007, instead of 15.3% in 2002. See the US
Census Bureau, Retail Trade, http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html
2See the groceries report prepared by the Competition Commission (2008).
3See the European Commission's (EC) cases M.1832 (Ahold/ICA F orbundet/CANICA, 2000), M.2161
(Ahold/Superdiplo, 2000) and M.2604 (ICA Ahold/Dansk Supermarket, 2001).
4See the EC's cases M.1904 (Carrefour/Gruppo GS, 2000), M.1960 (Carrefour/Marinopoulos, 2000), M.2115
(Carrefour/GB, 2000), M. 4522 (Carrefour/Ahold Polska, 2007) and M.5858 (Carrefour/Marinopoulos/Balkan JV,
2010).
5Bundesl ander Hessen, Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia.
6`Ish' in North Rhine-Westphalian, Kabel Baden-W urttemberg (KabelBW) and the Hessian cable operator `Iesy'.
Bundeskartellamt (Germany's Federal Cartel Oce) prohibited the proposed takeover due to the KDG's dominant
position in Germany.
See http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2004/2004 08 24.php
7See B7 { 22/05 and Iesy Repository/Ish, COMP/M.3674.
8The EC's case M.5734.
9Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008), Caprice and Schlippenbach (2008) provide recent surveys on the buyer power
debate. See also the Federal Trade Commission reports (2001, 2003) in the US, the Competition Commission's reports
(2000, 2008) in the UK, the EC's report (1999), and the EC's merger cases Kesko/Tuko (1997), Rewe/Meinl (1999)
and Carrefour/Promodes (2000). Inderst and Shaer (2008) provide a nice discussion on buyer power as a merger
defence.
10This goes back to Galbraith's (1952) \countervailing power" argument.
2eects on other, smaller, grocery retailers through the waterbed eect - that is, suppliers having
to charge more to smaller customers if large retailers force through price reductions which would
otherwise leave suppliers insuciently protable."11
Besides aecting purchasing terms in the upstream (input) market, a merger might enhance
the eciency of some or all merging parties in the downstream market because the rms learn
from each others' management expertise,12 improve their technologies by the diusion of know-
how, save costs from reallocating distribution across dierent stores, benet from synergies, or
save on costs of capital.13 In contrast, a merger might reduce the eciency of the merging parties
either because communication would be more costly within a larger rm14 or due to the con
icting
organizational cultures.15 When deciding whether to approve a merger, anti-trust authorities assess
the eciency gains from the merger against the possible anti-competitive eects of the merger.16
It is therefore important to understand how the eects of a merger on eciency interact with its
potential anti-competitive eects.
This paper analyzes the implications of a \buyer merger" between two independent downstream
rms on their rivals and consumers.17 Considering non-linear supply contracts, which appear to
be widespread practices,18 we show that when the supplier's cost is convex, the buyer merger leads
to size discounts for the merged entity, but these discounts are given through xed transfers, and
therefore have no impact on consumer prices or on the rival rms.19 However, when the merger
generates some eciency gains, we nd that buyer power leads to \waterbed eects", that is, higher
average taris for the rms not involved in the merger (small rms). It also increases the total
quantity in the nal markets. On the other hand, if the merger deteriorates the eciency of the
merging rms, it could still be protable due to the size discounts generated by the merger. In
this case, we obtain the opposite results: a buyer merger leads to anti-waterbed eects for the
other retailers and decreases the consumer surplus. If the supplier has a concave cost function, a
protable buyer merger is necessarily ecient and it also results in a higher total quantity in each
11The Competition Commission's report (2003), paragraph 2.218. See also Guidelines in the applicability of Article
81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements (2001/C3/02), paragraph 126: \The primary concerns in
the context of buying power are that ... it may cause cost increases for the purchasers' competitors on the selling
markets because either suppliers will try to recover price reductions for one group of customers by increasing prices
for other customers ..."
For a general discussion of waterbed eects see Dobson and Inderst (2007).
12Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
13Since larger rms usually have better access to the outside capital markets.
14Bolton and Dewatripont (1994).
15Weber and Camerer (2003).
16The EU Competition Law, Rules Applicable to Merger Control, 2010, pp. 186-187.
17We follow the literature by generating buyer power through an endogenous process of a merger between the
rms active in dierent markets (like in Inderst and Wey, 2007; Inderst and Valletti, 2011). In this respect our
paper diers from the earlier contributions by von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), and Dobson and Waterson (1997), who
consider mergers between competing rms.
18Empirical studies nd evidence that manufacturers and retailers use non-linear supply contracts in the markets
for bottled water in France (Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) and for yoghurt in the US (Berto Villas-Boas, 2007). The
supplier survey conducted by the GfK Group (2007), on the behalf of the Competition Commission, supports the use
of complex non-linear supply contracts in the UK grocery market.
19This result is in parallel with a statement in the European Commission Guidelines in the applicability of Article
81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements (2001/C3/02).
3market, however it leads to \anti-waterbed eects" on the small retailers.20
We focus on one upstream rm producing with a non-linear cost and supplying two competitive
markets in which there are many retailers competing in quantities.21 In the case of convex upstream
cost, for simplicity, we assume that retailers simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it contract oers
to the supplier,22 where the contracts determine a quantity and a tari. The supplier then decides
which oer(s) to accept. Finally, trade takes place according to accepted contracts. When the
supplier has a concave cost, we assume suciently high bargaining power for the supplier and
consider \contract equilibrium" as a solution to the negotiation between the supplier and each
retailer, since otherwise the existence of equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.23
Our paper contributes to the literature analyzing the sources and implications of buyer power.
Chipty and Snyder (1999) analyze the protability of a buyer merger between retailers. They show
that the eect of the merger on the merging entities' buyer power (vis- a-vis one supplier) depend
on the curvature of the industry surplus. For example, if the surplus function is concave (which
might be due to a convex cost of the supplier), the buyer merger results in size discounts for the
merging parties. Similar to Chipty and Snyder (1999), we model buyer power as an endogenous
process which originates from a buyer merger due to the convexity of the supplier's cost function
and/or downstream eciency generated by the merger. Dierent from Chipty and Snyder (1999),
we analyze the implications of buyer power on retail competition, rival retailers and consumer prices
by introducing downstream competition in each market.24
Alternatively, Katz (1987) models buyer power as a retailer's ability to integrate backwards by
paying a xed cost. When the retailer gets larger, it could reduce the average cost of its alternative
supply option and thereby get a better price from the supplier. Using the approach of Katz (1987),
Inderst and Valletti (2011) allow all competing retailers to have access to a costly outside option and
analyze the implications of a buyer merger on the wholesale prices oered by the main supplier, on
retail competition and on nal prices They show that, since a buyer merger creates size asymmetry
between the retailers, it leads to a lower wholesale price to the merged entity and higher wholesale
prices to the other retailers, that is, waterbed eects. They nd that waterbed eects are less
signicant when the xed cost of the alternative supplier is lower. As a result, buyer power might
increase the consumer surplus. This is found to be the case when the retail prices are strategic
complements and the xed cost of the alternative supplier is suciently low. Intuitively, in this
20As long as retailers' quantities are strategic substitutes.
21Main results would be valid if we considered a dierent timing leading to price competition. For instance, rst,
retailers simultaneously make two-part tari contract oers to the supplier, second, retailers with accepted contracts
compete  a la (dierentiated) Bertrand and then pay their taris to the supplier accordingly. See Bedre-Defolie and
Caprice (2009) for this generalization.
22A more balanced bargaining power distribution in \contract equilibrium" (as dened in Cr emer and Riordan,
1987) would lead to the same equilibrium quantities, but change only the prot sharing between the rms.
23See Segal and Whinston (2003).
24Alternatively, in the setup of Chipty and Snyder, Smith and Thanassoulis (2011) introduce uncertainty on the
supplier's volume of sales at simultaneous negotiations with independent buyers. When the upstream cost is convex,
they show that a larger buyer might pay a higher input price if the uncertainty is suciently high. In this case,
with a high probability the suplier sells zero to the other buyers which increases its expected marginal cost when it
negotiates with the large buyer.
4case the small retailers decrease their price as a reaction to a more ecient rival and increase their
price due to waterbed eects, and the former eect dominates since the xed cost is suciently low.
The assumption of linear contracts seems to be critical for their results, since with two-part taris,
as a reaction to the retailers' asymmetry, the supplier might not change the wholesale prices, but
might lower the xed fee of the merged entity and increase the xed fee of the other retailers.
Dierent from Inderst and Valletti (2011), we consider non-linear supply contracts. In our
paper, the buyer merger creates size asymmetry between the ex-ante symmetric retailers and so
generates a size discount (a lower average tari) for the merged entity if the supplier's cost is convex:
a larger retailer negotiates less at the margin of the supplier's cost. However, this does not lead
to a larger average tari for a small rm unless the merger increases the eciency of the merging
parties. In the case of an ecient merger, the merged entity sells more at each store and therefore
lowers its average tari even further. This changes the bargaining position of the other retailers
and so leads to a higher average tari for each small retailer, that is, there are waterbed eects
due to the convexity of the supplier's cost function. When quantities are strategic substitutes, the
small rms sell less, competing against a more ecient rival, so the net eect of an ecient merger
is not straightforward.25 We show that the total quantity in each market is higher post-merger.
On the other hand, if the supplier's cost is concave, the size of a retailer increases its average
price, and so a buyer merger would be protable only if it generates eciency. In this case, the
buyer merger results in a lower average tari for the other retailers, that is, there are anti-waterbed
eects. Despite paying a lower average tari, we show that each small retailer sells less post-merger
since they face a more ecient rival and quantities are strategic substitutes. As in the convex case,
we nd that the ecient merger increases the total quantity in each market.
Majumdar (2006), Chen (2003) and Bedre-Defolie and Shaer (2011) provide analyses of wa-
terbed eects in a context of ex-ante asymmetric retailers (a dominant or large) retailer and com-
petitive fringe or small rms). Majumdar (2006) shows that waterbed eects exist since the large
retailer wants to own more stores to increase its rivals' costs (the spot price for smaller retailers) as
there are fewer small stores over which the upstream xed cost can be spread.26 Modeling buyer
power as an exogenous bargaining strength of the dominant rm, Chen (2003) and Bedre-Defolie
and Shaer (2011) illustrate anti-waterbed eects on competitive fringe rms.27 Chen (2003) nds
that an increased buyer power lowers the nal price, but the other papers conclude that the impact
of buyer power on nal prices is not clear.
The next section presents our benchmark model with a convex upstream cost. In Section 3
we solve for the equilibrium of the benchmark. Section 4 analyzes the implications of a protable
buyer merger. In Section 5 we extend our analysis to the case where the supplier has a concave
25When quantities are strategic complements, small rms sell more as a result of an ecient merger, so the ecient
merger always increases the total quantity.
26Majumdar (2006) considers a large retailer which could contract with two perfectly competitive manufacturers
outside of the spot market and, moreover, could appoint one or both of the manufacturers which then commit(s) to
production by sinking a xed cost.
27Bedre-Defolie and Shaer (2011) show that by oering a lower wholesale price to the fringe rms, a supplier
could increase its outside option and thereby capture a higher rent from a more powerful dominant retailer.
5cost function. Finally, we discuss the case of strategic complementarity and conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
We consider a vertical industry where one monopoly supplier sells its product to two locally com-
petitive retail markets. In each local market n identical retail stores resell the product of the
supplier competing in quantities, where n  2. The supplier's cost of producing Q units is C (Q),
which is assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, C0 (Q) > 0, and strictly
convex, C00 (Q) > 0.28 Retailers have constant marginal cost of retailing c. Let Qh denote the total
quantity sold in local market h (h = 1;2). Suppose that for 8h, the inverse market demand is given
by P (Qh), which is twice continuously dierentiable and downward sloping, P0 (Qh) < 0. We make
the following assumption on the demand function,
Assumption 1. P0 (Q) + QP00 (Q) < 0 for any Q,
to ensure that the second-order condition for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
is satised.
The supply contracts are assumed to be quantity-forcing contracts. The contract of retailer i
species quantity qi to be delivered to retailer i and money transfer ti to be made from retailer i
to the supplier, for i = 1;:::;2n.
We assume that retailers have all the bargaining power vis- a-vis the supplier.29 Hence, retailers
simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it contract oers to the supplier who in turn decides whether
to accept these oers or not. The retailers with accepted contracts buy the agreed quantity and
pays its tari. Retailers then re-sell the quantity they purchased to consumers. Retail competition
is therefore  a la Cournot, where quantities are determined by signed supply contracts between
retailers and the supplier.30
Let T denote the total transfers made: T =
2n P
i=1




qi. Moreover, T[i] (respectively Q[i]) refer to the sum of all transfers (quantities) except for
the tari paid (quantity sold) by retailer i. Similarly, Qh[i] denotes the sum of all quantities for
local market h except for the quantity sold by retailer i.
With this notation, the prot of the supplier is written as





28We extend the analysis to concave cost in Section 5.
29This assumption is for simplicity. The main qualitative results would go through if we allowed for shared
bargaining power in contract equilibrium where quantity-forcing contracts are determined by simultaneous and secret
bilateral negotiations between the supplier and retailers, as in Allain and Chambolle (2011), for example. The proofs
of this extension are available upon request from the authors.
30We discuss the case of strategic complementarity in Section 6.
6and the prot of retailer i, which is active in market h, is equal to
i =

P(Qh[i] + qi)   c

qi   ti:
3 Equilibrium Contracts and Payos
Consider the contract choice of retailer i, taking the other contracts as given. Retailer i chooses

















where the disagreement payo of the supplier with retailer i, U[i], is the supplier's prot when












since otherwise the retailer could increase its prots by raising ti. In other words, in equilibrium,
each retailer pays a tari equal to its cost contribution. Plugging the equilibrium tari (2) into the































In equilibrium, each retailer chooses a quantity which maximizes the bilateral prot with the
supplier. Using the fact that the markets are symmetric, condition (3) yields the equilibrium
quantity, q
i = q:
P0 (nq)q + P (nq) = c + C0 (2nq); (4)
where the equilibrium quantity of local market h and of the industry are respectively Q
h = nq
and Q = 2nq. Hence, each retailer pays
t = C (2nq)   C ((2n   1)q): (5)
and earns
 = [P (nq)   c]q   [C (2nq)   C ((2n   1)q)]: (6)
31Assumption 1 ensures that the second-order condition holds.
74 Buyer Merger and Size Discounts
We extend the model by introducing a single large retailer L as a result of a merger between two
independent stores. The merged entity (L) now operates two stores which are active in dierent
retail markets and makes a quantity oer to the supplier to distribute it through its stores. A small
retailer, S, operates only one store, and thus makes a quantity oer to the supplier to distribute it
at that store.
Let qL and qS denote, respectively, the total quantity delivered by the large retailer and a




+ (n   1)qS; Q = 2Qh:
We allow for the possibility that the merger aects not only the size but also the downstream
eciency of the merging parties. Let c +  be the marginal cost of retailing at each store of the
large retailer. When  = 0, the merger has no eect on retail eciency. However, when  < 0
(respectively  > 0), the merger improves (deteriorates) downstream eciency. For instance, the
merger could result in some economies of scale downstream or other types of synergies and/or
increase the costs of communication and coordination within the merged entity. If the eciencies
generated by the merger are higher (lower) than the ineciencies produced by the merger, we say
that  < 0 ( > 0). For the small retailers the marginal cost of retailing is still equal to c.
The merged entity chooses (qL;tL) by maximizing its total prot from operating two stores























After plugging the binding constraint into the problem, the optimality condition characterizes



















where Qh[L] = (n   1)qS and Q[L] = 2(n   1)qS. By the Implicit Function Theorem, observe that





The small retailers choose their contracts by solving problem (1), for i = S, and thus their












By taking the total derivative of the rst-order condition, we illustrate that the small retailer's























due to Assumption 1 and the convexity of the cost. The solution to equations (8) and (9) charac-
terizes the equilibrium quantities after the merger, q
L and q
S . The prot of the large retailer and
the small retailer are, respectively,

L () = [P (Q
h )   (c + )]q
L   [C (Q)   C (Q   q
L )]; (10)

S () = [P (Q
h )   c]q
S   [C (Q)   C (Q   q
S )]:
Comparing the optimality conditions before, (3), and after the merger, (8) and (9), gives us
the following results:
Lemma 1 When a buyer merger has no impact on retail eciency,  = 0, it does not change the








S are such that the large retailer pays a lower average tari than
the small retailers, which pay exactly the same tari as before the merger:
t
L (0) = C (2nq)   C (2(n   1)q) < 2t;
t
S (0) = t:
Intuitively, the large retailer negotiates a larger quantity with the supplier which has a convex
cost function, and thus has a higher incremental contribution to the industry prot than the small
retailers. As a result, the large retailer pays a lower average tari, that is, gets size discounts.
Lemma 1 implies that the merging parties earn more than they would get if they were separated,

L (0) = [P (nq)   c]2q   [C (2nq)   C (2(n   1)q)] > 2;
which proves the protability of the merger:
Corollary 1 A buyer merger, which has no impact on retail eciency,  = 0, is always protable,
since it brings size discounts. Size discounts for the large retailer alter neither equilibrium quantities
nor the prots of the small retailers, that is, there is no waterbed eect:

S (0) = .
9Since we consider non-linear supply contracts and, in equilibrium, each contract is bilaterally
optimal holding the others' contracts xed, the buyer merger results in a transfer of prots from the
supplier to the large buyer without aecting quantities and retail prices. The parties always want
to merge to increase their size and negotiate a better deal with the supplier. When the supplier
has strictly increasing incremental production costs, a small buyer negotiates at the margin, where
incremental costs are high. In contrast, if two (or more) small buyers merge, they account for a
larger fraction of the supplier's total sales, and thus negotiate less at the margin, thereby paying a
lower price per unit.
When the buyer merger improves retail eciency,  < 0, the parties always want to merge for
two reasons: To extract discounts from the supplier and to benet from the eciencies generated
by the merger. On the other hand, if the merger deteriorates downstream eciency,  > 0, it
might still be protable. This would be the case, for example, when the ineciency produced by
the merger is low enough to be compensated by the gains from size discounts.
Lemma 2 If the merger generates less eciencies (or more ineciencies), the equilibrium prot
of the merged entity decreases, that is, @
L < 0:
The merger's eciency (or ineciency) aects the merged entity's prot through two channels.
First, when  decreases, becoming more ecient (or less inecient) increases its margin and so
its prot. Second, when the merged entity becomes more ecient (or less inecient), the rival
retailers' quantities change. Since retailers' quantities are strategic substitutes, the small retailers
sell less as a reaction to a more ecient (or less inecient) merger , that is,
dq
S
d > 0. Moreover,














because the inverse demand is decreasing and the upstream cost is convex. As a result, the large













Note that a buyer merger is always protable if  = 0 (see Corollary 1) and that we have
d
L
d < 0 from Lemma 2. By continuity, we show that
Corollary 2 There exists ~  > 0 such that for any  < ~ , a buyer merger is protable.
A buyer merger aecting downstream eciency is going to change the equilibrium quantities
due to the eciency impact of the merger.
Proposition 1 If a buyer merger generates downstream eciency,  < 0, we have
q




and Q < Q;




< q < q
S and Q < Q:
Corollary 3 As a result of a buyer merger aecting downstream eciency, the total change in the
small retailers' quantities is lower than the change in the merging parties' quantities:
2(n   1)jq
S   qj < jq
L   2qj:
When the merger improves the eciency of the merging parties, each store of the merged entity
has a competitive advantage against the small retailers and so sells more than before. This implies
that each small retailer sells less after the merger. The rst-order eect of the eciency gains on
the large retailer's quantity dominates the second-order eect on the small retailers' quantities.
Hence, the total quantity increases after an ecient buyer merger. Symmetric intuition applies for
an inecient buyer merger.
Since the supplier has a non-linear cost function, the changes in quantities modify the average
tari paid by the small and the large retailers. The large retailer could further obtain more size
discounts since it is asking for a larger quantity and the small retailers are buying a lower quantity.
As a result, each small retailer negotiates more at the margin, and so pays a higher average tari. To
see this let t
S (q) and t
S (q) denote a small retailer's transfer for a given q when the other retailers
sell their equilibrium quantities, respectively, before and after the merger: Before the merger a small
retailer pays
t
S (q) = C (2q + (2n   3)q + q)   C (2q + (2n   3)q):
and after the merger it pays
t
S (q) = [C (q
L + (2n   3)q
S + q)   C (q
L + (2n   3)q
S )]:
Consider for instance the changes after an ecient merger ( < 0). From Corollary 3, we have
q
L   2q > (2n   3)(q   q
S ). A small retailer pays more for any volume of sales q, t
S (q) >
t
S (q); because its cost contribution is higher when the other retailers' total quantity is higher.
Symmetrically, for an inecient merger, a small retailer pays a lower average tari post-merger
since the other retailers' total quantity is lower: 2q   q
L > (2n   3)(q
S   q).
This discussion illustrates the eects of a buyer merger on the average tari of a small retailer.
Since we consider non-linear supply contracts, we dene a waterbed eect as an increase in the
average tari of a small retailer due to the merger. If the merger decreases the average tari of a
small retailer, we say that there are waterbed eects. The following lemma summarizes our results
on waterbed eects:
Lemma 3 As a result of an ecient buyer merger, each small retailer pays a higher average tari
for a given volume of sales, that is, there are waterbed eects. Conversely, an inecient buyer
merger results in a lower average tari for a small retailer, that is, anti-waterbed eects.
11The net eect of the merger on a small retailer also depends on how the merger changes its
gross prot. Let 
S (q) (respectively, 
S (q)) denote a small retailer's prot for a given quantity q
when the other retailers sell their equilibrium quantities before the merger (respectively after the
merger). Before the merger, a small rival retailer gets

S (q) = [P (q + (n   2)q + q)   c]q   t
S (q);
















As a result of an ecient merger, the gross prot of a small retailer decreases since the market
price decreases due to the increase of the total quantity sold by its rivals. The reduction in the
gross prot and the increase of the tari lead to lower prot for the small retailer. Symmetrically,
an inecient merger increases the gross prot of a small retailer by increasing the nal price. As
a result of the price increase and the reduction in its tari, the small retailer earns more.
Proposition 2 As a result of an ecient (respectively inecient) buyer merger, each small retailer
earns less (respectively more) prot for a given volume of sales.
5 Extension: concave upstream cost
When the upstream cost is concave, there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if the
retailers have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it oers to the supplier.32 To
avoid this problem of inexistence, we allow for distributed bargaining power between the supplier
and retailers.
More specically, we assume that supply contracts are determined by simultaneous and secret
bilateral negotiations between the supplier and retailers. We look for a contract equilibrium such
that there is no bilateral incentive for the supplier and any retailer to alter the terms of their
contract. By denition, a contract equilibrium is immune to any bilateral deviation, holding other
retailers' supply contracts xed.33 A contract equilibrium is therefore a vector of supply contracts,
(q;t), such that for 8i, (q
i ;t
i) maximizes the bilateral prots U + i of the upstream rm and
retailer i, taking (Q
[i];T
[i]) as given.
32In a candidate equilibrium each retailer oers the cost contribution of its quantity to the supplier's total cost of
production, but then the supplier's prot would be negative due to the concavity of the cost. See Segal and Whinston
(2003).
33Cr emer and Riordan (1987) introduce the contract equilibrium concept in a setup where the interdependence
between bilateral supply contracts is due to the non-linearity of the supplier's cost and due to asymmetric information
between the supplier and its independent customers. O'Brien and Shaer (1992) re-dene contract equilibrium in a
setup where the interdepence between bilateral supply contracts comes from the downstream competition between
retailers. Our contractual setup is a combination of these two setups since we look for a contract equilibrium
of bilateral supply contracts negotiated simultaneously and secretly between locally competitive retailers and the
supplier which has a concave cost function.
12Since the upstream cost is concave, the quantities could be strategic complements. We therefore
assume that the supplier's cost is not so concave that the quantities are strategic substitutes:
Assumption 1a. P00 (Q)q + P0 (Q)   2C00 (2Q) < 0 for any q  Q:34
Moreover, to ensure that the equilibrium prot of each retailer is decreasing in its rival's
quantity of sales, we assume that a change in a rival's sales aects the revenue of the retailer more
than its eect on the retailer's cost contribution:35
Assumption 1b. P0(Q)q < C0(2Q)   C0 (2Q   2q) for any q  Q:
For example, a quadratic concave cost, C (Q) = aQ + b
2Q2 with b < 0, and linear demand
satisfy both Assumption 1a and 1b if b >
P0(Q)
2 .
Consider a vector of contracts which simultaneously solve asymmetric Nash bargaining solu-
tions between the supplier and each retailer. The disagreement payo of the upstream rm with
retailer i, U[i], is the supplier's prot when the negotiation with retailer i fails, taking the other
supply contracts as given:





Each retailer's disagreement payo with the supplier is zero since there is no alternative supplier.
The Nash bargaining problem between the supplier and retailer i is described by the disagreement
points (U[i];0) and the relative (exogenous) bargaining power of the supplier vis- a-vis the retailer,
 2 (0;1).36 Since the supplier and retailer i could share the gains from trade through xed tari
ti, at any Nash bargaining solution, the supplier and retailer i set qi to maximize their bilateral
prots U +i taking the other supply contracts (Q[i];T[i]) as given. Hence, any asymmetric Nash
bargaining equilibrium is a contract equilibrium with a particular distribution of rents (O'Brien



































Using the fact that all markets are symmetric, q
i = q, the rst-order conditions of problem
(12) yield the optimal quantities,
P0 (nq)q + P (nq) = c + C0 (2nq): (13)
34Under this assumption, the second-order conditions of the optimization problems are also satised.
35Observe that this assumption is always satised for a convex cost. Moreover, for a concave cost where the
concavity of the cost function decreases at larger quantities, that is, C
000(:) < 0; Assumption 1a implies Assumption
1b.
36Parameter  captures any exogenous factor which aects the supplier's relative bargaining power.
13The optimal taris are used to share the bilateral prots with respect to the relative bargaining
power:
t = [P (nq)   c]q + (1   )[C (2nq)   C ((2n   1)q)]: (14)
Each retailer's equilibrium payo is equal to its share over the incremental contribution to the
industry prot:
 = (1   )[[P (nq)   c]q   [C (2nq)   C ((2n   1)q)]]; (15)
and the supplier earns

U = 2nf[P (nq)   c]q + (1   )[C (2nq)   C ((2n   1)q)]g   C (2nq): (16)
To ensure that the supplier's equilibrium prot is non-negative, we dene threshold  at which

U = 0 (see the Appendix for the explicit denition of ) and assume that the supplier's bargaining
power is suciently high,   
As before, we introduce a single large retailer L as a result of a merger between two independent
stores. Let (q
L ;t
L ) and (q
S ;t
S ) denote, respectively, the total quantity delivered and the tari
paid by the large retailer and a small retailer (given that, by symmetry, all small retailers buy the






+ (n   1)q
S ; Q = 2Q
h :
For a given , the contract equilibrium for a small retailer maximizes the joint prot of the supplier





















2 + (n   2)q
S and Q
[S] = q
L + (2n   3)q
S . Similarly, the contract equilibrium






















where the large retailer's cost is c + , Q
h[L] = (n   1)q
S and Q
[L] = 2(n   1)q
S . The simulta-
neous solution to equations (17) and (18) characterizes the equilibrium quantities for a contract
equilibrium after the merger, q
L and q
S .37
The optimal taris are used to share the bilateral prots with respect to the relative bargaining
power. The tari paid by the large retailer and the taris paid by the small retailers are respectively:
37Compared to the case where the retailers have all the bargaining power, the pre-merger (respectively post-merger)
equilibrium quantities are the same. In other words, bargaining power distribution in a contract equilibrium does
not aect the equilibrium quantities, but only aect the equilibrium prot sharing between the rms.
14t
L () = [P (Q
h )   (c + )]q
L + (1   )[C (Q)   C (Q   q
L )]; (19)
t
S () = [P (Q
h )   c]q
S + (1   )[C (Q)   C (Q   q
S )]:
The prots of the large retailer and the small retailers are respectively:

L () = (1   )[[P (Q
h )   (c + )]q
L   [C (Q)   C (Q   q
L )]]; (20)

S () = (1   )[[P (Q
h )   c]q
S   [C (Q)   C (Q   q
S )]]:
The prot of the supplier is,

U () = [[P (Q
h )   (c + )]q
L + 2(n   1)[P (Q
h )   c]q
S ] (21)
+(1   )[[C (Q)   C (Q   q
L )] + 2(n   1)[C (Q)   C (Q   q
S )]]   C (Q):
As we did for the pre-merger case, we dene threshold  (in the Appendix) such that for   
the supplier's equilibrium prot is positive post-merger.
Hence, when the supplier's cost is concave, the sucient condition to ensure that the supplier
earns non-negative prot in equilibrium is that





When a buyer merger has no impact on retail eciency, i.e.,  = 0, it is never protable due to
the concavity of the upstream cost function. More precisely, comparing the large retailer's prots
before and after the merger, (15) and (20), shows that

L (0) = (1   )[P (nq)   c]2q   [C (2nq)   C (2(n   1)q)] < 2:
Lemma 4 The equilibrium prot of the merged entity increases in the level of eciency of the
merger, i.e., @
L < 0:
By Assumption 1a retailers' quantities are strategic substitutes, so the small retailers sell less
as a reaction to a more ecient merger, that is,
dq
S
d > 0. Moreover, by Assumption 1b, the large

























  (1   )q
L < 0:
For  = 0, we previously showed that the merger is not protable, 
L (0) < 2. By Lemma
154, we know that @
L < 0. Since the pre-merger prot of a merging entity, 2; is constant in ,
by continuity of the merged entity's prot in , we show that
Corollary 4 There exists a threshold e  < 0 such that for any  < e , the buyer merger is protable.
The corollary implies that when the cost function is concave, the merger is protable only if it
improves eciency. We moreover show that the merger changes the equilibrium quantities in the
same way as an ecient merger in the case of convex cost (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 3 If a buyer merger is protable, we have q
S < q <
q
L
2 and Q < Q.
To analyze the merger's impact on the equilibrium tari of the small retailers, we dene
function
tS (q;x;y) = [P (x + q)   c]q + (1   )[C (y + q)   C (y)];
for q;x;y > 0. We have tS (q;x;y) is decreasing in x and also in y, since P0(:) < 0 and C00(:) < 0:
Before the merger, the transfer of a small retailer for a given quantity is equal to tS (q;x;y)
for x = (n   1)q and y = (2n   1)q: After the merger, for the same quantity, the small retailer
pays transfer tS (q;x;y) for x = Q
h   q







2 > q and q




(n   1)q = x and y = Q   q
S > (2n   1)q = y. We thus show that tS (q;x;y) <
tS (q;x;y) for any q, that is, the small retailer pays less post-merger.
Lemma 5 As a result of a protable buyer merger, each small retailer pays a lower average tari
for a given volume of sales, that is, there are anti-waterbed eects.
The lemma shows that the ecient merger increases the prot of a small retailer by reducing
its average tari. On the other hand, the ecient merger decreases each small retailer's revenue
by lowering the retail price in each local market. Hence, the net impact of the merger on a small
retailer's prot is not straightforward. Under Assumption 1b, we show that the negative eect of
the merger dominates the positive eect:
Proposition 4 As a result of a protable buyer merger, each small retailer earns less for a given
volume of sales.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of ecient or inecient buyer mergers, which are
mergers between retailers from dierent markets. More precisely, we focus on the interaction
between merger eciency and buyer power concerns in a setup where one manufacturer with a
non-linear cost function sells its product to two locally competitive retail markets.
16The European Commission has identied two potential concerns arising from buyer power:
rst, lower purchasing costs for powerful buyers might not be passed on to nal consumers; second,
there might be waterbed eects, that is, lower taris for powerful buyers might be at the expense
of higher taris for less powerful buyers.
Our paper supports the rst concern if the buyer merger has no eciency eect. In this case,
we formally show that even if a larger buyer obtains size discounts from the supplier, there is no
pass-on of lower purchasing costs to consumer prices when supply contracts are non-linear. With
regard to the second concern, we nd that there are waterbed (respectively, anti-waterbed) eects
if a buyer merger increases (respectively, decreases) the retail eciency of merging parties and
the upstream cost function is convex. When the cost function is concave, there are only anti-
waterbed eects. The merger's eect on eciency is the only determinant of the implications for
the consumer surplus. In each retail market, the merger decreases the nal price if and only if the
merger improves the eciency of the merging parties, regardless of its impact on the average tari
of small retailers. Dierent from the literature, in our paper if a waterbed eect exists, it always
increases the consumer surplus.
Besides the results summarized above, our analysis would have interesting implications for
retail markets supplied by the same manufacturer and where the merged entity is not active, which
we refer to as independent markets. When the upstream cost is convex, an ecient merger would
lead to a higher retail price in each independent market through increasing the average tari of
each retailer in those markets. This means that, by contrast to the markets where the merged
entity is active, waterbed eects lead to a higher retail price in each independent market. The
opposite result holds if the merger is inecient, in which case the merger decreases the price of
each independent market due to anti-waterbed eects. The same mechanism applies when the
supplier has a concave cost, in which case anti-waterbed eects originate from the eciency of the
merger.
We consider the case where quantities are strategic substitutes, since this was the most inter-
esting scenario in our framework. In this case a small retailer sells less as a reaction to a more
ecient rival (a store of the merged entity). When the upstream cost function is convex, this further
deteriorates the bargaining position of a small retailer and so increases its average tari, lowering
its quantity even further. Hence, in this case it is not straightforward whether this negative eect
of an ecient merger is dominated by the quantity expansion of the merged entity. However, if
quantities were strategic complements, the impact of an ecient merger on the nal prices would
be straightforward since each small retailer sells more when its rival is more ecient.
Our work could be extended to deal with the long-run implications of buyer power on upstream
investment, like in Inderst and Wey (2007), and Battigalli et al. (2007). Another promising research
avenue is allowing for upstream competition (see, for instance, de Fontenay and Gans, 2007).
17APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
We do the proof for  > 0: A symmetric argument would show the claim for  < 0.
First step: Q < Q
Before the merger, the rst-order condition for equilibrium quantity q is given by
P0 (Q
h)q + P (Q




Summing the condition for all retailers in a local market gives:
P0 (Q
h)Q
h + nP (Q
h) = nc + nC0 (Q
h): (22)
After the merger, equilibrium quantities for the large rm (L), and a small rm (S) are











S + P (Q
h ) = c + C0 (2Q
h ):
Summing the conditions for all retailers in a local market, we obtain
P0 (Q
h )Q
h + nP (Q
h ) = nc +  + nC0 (2Q
h ): (23)
Since  > 0, we have nc +  > nc and comparing expressions (22) and (23), we then obtain:
P0 (Q
h )Q
h + nP (Q
h )   nC0 (2Q
h ) > P0 (Q
h)Q
h + nP (Q
h)   nC0 (2Q
h):
From our assumptions, P00 (Q)Q + P0 (Q) < 0, P0 (Q) < 0 and C00 (Q) > 0, we deduce that
P00 (Q)Q + (n + 1)P0 (Q)   2nC00 (2Q) < 0, which implies that P0(Q)Q + nP(Q)   nC0 (2Q) is
decreasing in Q, we therefore have Q
h < Q
h and, Q < Q by multiplying by 2.
Second step: q < q
S
We show the claim by contradiction:
From our assumptions, P00 (Q)Q + P0 (Q) < 0 and P0 (Q) < 0, we deduce that P00 (Q)y +
P0 (Q) < 0 for any 0 < y < Q (for P00 (Q) < 0; P00 (Q)y + P0 (Q) < 0 since P0 (Q) < 0, and for
P00 (Q) > 0; P00 (Q)y + P0 (Q) < 0 since P00 (Q)y + P0 (Q) < P00 (Q)Q + P0 (Q) for any 0 < y < Q
and P00 (Q)Q+P0 (Q) < 0) which implies that P0(Q)y +P(Q) is decreasing in Q. Moreover, since
C00 (Q) > 0; we have P0(Q)y + P(Q)   C0 (2Q) which is decreasing in Q:
18From Q
h < Q
h, we then obtain:
P0(Q
h )y + P(Q
h )   C0 (2Q
h ) > P0(Q
h)y + P(Q
h)   C0 (2Q
h):
Suppose now that, q > q




h )   C0 (2Q
h ) > P0(Q
h)q + P(Q
h)   C0 (2Q
h);
since P0(Q)y + P(Q)   C0 (2Q) is decreasing in y (P0 (Q) < 0):
Using the following rst-order conditions:
P0 (Q
h)q + P (Q




S + P (Q






h )   C0 (2Q
h ) = P0(Q
h)q + P(Q
h)   C0 (2Q
h);
that is, we reach a result that contradicts the inequality at the beginning. Therefore, by contradic-








h (from the rst step) and q < q




Proof of Proposition 3
We follow the same methodology as in the convex case (see the proof of the Proposition 1).
The proof is now for  < 0.
First step: Q > Q
Before the merger, the rst-order condition for equilibrium quantity q is given by
P0 (Q
h)q + P (Q




Summing the condition for all retailers in a local market give us:
P0 (Q
h)Q
h + nP (Q
h) = nc + nC0 (Q
h): (24)
After the merger, the equilibrium quantities for the large rm (L), and a small rm (S) are











S + P (Q
h ) = c + C0 (2Q
h ):
19Summing the conditions for all retailers in a local market, we obtain
P0 (Q
h )Q
h + nP (Q
h ) = nc +  + nC0 (2Q
h ): (25)
Since  < 0, we have nc +  < nc and comparing expressions (24) and (25), we show that
P0 (Q
h )Q
h + nP (Q
h )   nC0 (2Q
h ) < P0 (Q
h)Q
h + nP (Q
h)   nC0 (2Q
h): (26)
From Assumption 1a for q =
Q
n, we have P00 (Q)
Q
n + P0 (Q)   2C00 (2Q) < 0. Multiplying the both
sides by n proves that P00 (Q)Q + nP0 (Q)   2nC00 (2Q) < 0 and therefore
P00 (Q)Q + (n + 1)P0 (Q)   2nC00 (2Q) < 0;
since P0 (Q) < 0. This implies that P0 (Q)Q + nP (Q)   nC0 (2Q) is decreasing in Q. As a result,
inequality (26) proves that Q
h > Q
h and Q > Q.
Second step: q > q
S
Assumption 1a, P00 (Q)q + P0 (Q)   2C00 (2Q) < 0 for any q  Q, and P0(Q) < 0 ensures that
the function P0(Q)q + P(Q)   C0 (2Q) is decreasing in Q:
Since Q
h > Q
h (from the rst step), we have
P0(Q
h )q + P(Q
h )   C0 (2Q
h ) < P0(Q
h)q + P(Q
h)   C0 (2Q
h): (27)
Using the rst-order condition of a small retailer before and then after the merger, respectively,
P0 (Q
h)q + P (Q




S + P (Q






h )   C0 (2Q
h ) = P0(Q
h)q + P(Q
h)   C0 (2Q
h);
The latter together with inequality (27) imply that q > q







h (from the rst step) and q > q




Proof of Proposition 4
We dene function
S (q;x;y) = (1   )([P (x + q)   c]q   [C (y + q)   C (y)]);
for q;x;y > 0. We have S (q;x;y) is decreasing in x, but is increasing in y, since P0(:) < 0 and
20C00(:) < 0: Before the merger, for a given quantity q, the small retailer earns S (q;x;y) for x =
(n   1)q and y = (2n   1)q and after the merger, it obtains S (q;x;y) for x = Q
h   q
S
and y = 2Q
h   q
S . Since we have x > x, y > y, S (q;x;y) is decreasing in x, but is
increasing in y, the eect of the merger on the prot of the small retailer is not straightforward.





= (1   )











Our claim is that
dS(q;x;y)
d > 0 and therefore the small retailer's prot decreases post-merger.
By denition of the equilibrium quantities, we have y = 2x + q




= (1   )

P0 (x + q)q   2











From Proposition 3, we have dx
d < 0 and
dq
S
d > 0. Moreover, C0 (y + q)   C0 (y) < 0 by the
concavity of the cost. As a result,
dS(q;x;y)






is the case by Assumption 1b since y + q = 2(x + q). 
Thresholds on 
We dene the thresholds on  above which the supplier's equilibrium prot is positive. Before










Since the industry prot is non-negative in equilibrium, P (nq) c 
C(2nq)





q , both the numerator and denominator are positive, and the
numerator is lower. Hence,  belongs to (0;1). Moreover, a more concave cost function increases
the numerator of the latter fraction and decreases its denominator. As a result, .increases in the
concavity of the cost function for a given q.




h )   [(C (2Q
h )   C (2Q
h   q
L )) + 2(n   1)(C (2Q









































Since the industry prot is strictly positive, (P (Q
h )   c)2Q
h   q
L   C (2Q
h ) > 0; and the
numerator is positive by the concavity of the cost function,  is between 0 and 1:
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